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3.1  Introduction 
This paper will argue that flow-of-funds data have considerable po- 
tential for addressing the role of finance in savings mobilization. Some 
of  the data that have  been compiled  on the flow of funds in  Latin 
America are examined to show that, despite their limitations, they are 
useful in gaining a better understanding of the sectoral distribution of 
savings. Attempts at compiling flow of funds in Latin America go back 
at least as far as the early  1960s in  Argentina  and Chile  and  have 
continued, if  intermittently, until the present day. There has not, how- 
ever, been a concomitant stream of research analyzing the data. As a 
result-with  the exception of Colombia, which continued and improved 
the preparation  of financial accounts, integrating them with the real 
accounts in the process-most  of the countries in Latin America have 
abandoned  their  short-lived  forays  into  flow-of-funds  accounting. 
Nevertheless, the studies examined here produce estimates of house- 
hold savings considerably higher than those of the national income and 
product accounts (NIPAs). 
Flow-of-funds analysis can be useful in understanding the investment 
uses of  savings. It can also be useful in understanding and encouraging 
saving itself. It is an open question whether the level of investment is 
constrained by the amount of available savings or whether new savings 
arise spontaneously  to  meet the needs of investors. If the rate of savings 
is the constraint, as  is argued by McKinnon (1973), Shaw (1973), and oth- 
ers (owing to an implicit assumption of excess demand for investment 
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funds), how much can the savings rate be enhanced by manipulation of 
the financial environment?  The  answers  to  these questions,  accepting the 
premise that marginal savings in the economy goes into a financial asset 
(essentially true for households), are entwined with the responsiveness 
of savershsset holders to the rate of return on their savings. This, pre- 
sumably, is the principal mechanism through which the needs of borrow- 
ers are communicated to actual or  potential savers. 
Flow-of-funds analysis offers the possibility for innovative research 
on the relation between real and financial decision making now that it 
is evident that finance is of importance to the real behavior of econ- 
omies. It is well suited to deal with questions of choice among com- 
peting financial assets by measuring financial flows among asset types 
and the allocation of net savings. Notwithstanding the pitfalls of finan- 
cial model building, econometric models such as that of Hendershott 
(1977) permit an even more sophisticated examination of the effect of 
interest  rate manipulation on portfolio  shifting.  In addition, the less 
formal examination of financial flows in response to interest rate and 
other policies can be highly suggestive as to the potential for voluntary 
financial savings in the enhancement of real investment. 
In order to construct and interpret a set of flow-of-funds accounts 
(FFAs) successfully, it is necessary to sectorize the economy in a func- 
tional way that addresses likely policy questions. “Government” and 
“rest  of world”  are natural and easy-to-define  categories, though at 
the fringe the exact definition may be largely a matter of taste. The 
natural division within the private sector, that between producers and 
consumers (or firms and households), is particularly difficult in devel- 
oping countries. Indeed, McKinnon and other analysts frequently use 
the “firm-household” as their representative agent. Flow-of-funds sys- 
tems in  industrial countries typically  differentiate  between  corpora- 
tions,  noncorporate enterprise, and households. The firm-household 
would correspond to the aggregation of noncorporate enterprise and 
households, and  in  some places  this  is done. In  others, though  the 
process requires some ad hoc estimation, a traditional division between 
households and firms is made. In still others, the task of sectoring has 
proved too great, and the private sector is presented as a unitary entity. 
These issues are taken up in depth in the next section. 
3.2  Flow of  Funds in Latin America 
Pilot flow-of-funds studies were done in the early  1970s in several 
countries of the Western IIemisphere: Colombia (1962-69),  Peru (1965- 
70), Costa Rica (1961-71),  Jamaica (1964-72),  and Brazil (1959-69, 
selected years) (Banco de la Republica  1971; Comision Nacional  Su- 
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n.d.; Bank of Jamaica 1974; Banco Central do Brasil 1973). This and 
the next section of the paper focus on these studies, though work has 
been done on financial accounts in some other countries as well. As is 
the case in Argentina, though, the data are not always amenable to the 
comparison of NIPA and FFA savings data because the FFAs are made 
to conform to NIPA  savings figures (for a discussion  of Argentina’s 
FFAs, see Banco Central de la Republica Argentina 1972 and Reynolds 
1982). The accounts examined here do allow comparison and also give 
important components of the countries’ national balance sheets (for 
discussion of national balance sheets, see Goldsmith  1985). 
A country’s national accounts are commonly  divided into several 
categories: income and product, input-output, and flow of funds are 
the major divisions. The NIPAs and the FFAs intersect over the mea- 
surement of intersectoral capital flows. Sectoral saving minus sectoral 
investment in the NIPAs should generate a figure for net financial saving 
that matches the change  in the financial assets of that sector in the 
FFAs. Differences in definitions and in method, though, would ensure 
that the corresponding figures from the two accounts not match. The 
fact that some fairly strong and divergent assumptions underlie each 
set of  accounts further guarantees that the figures will be different. 
However,  an integration of the accounts involving reconciliation  of 
divergent estimates can and has been done in some countries, improv- 
ing the reliability of both sets of accounts. 
The flow-of-funds studies that have been done in Latin America were 
prepared with varying degrees of comprehensiveness. At one end of 
the spectrum, the Brazilian  flow-of-funds study covers little beyond 
the banking system. At the other end is Colombia, which continues to 
compile FFAs, and where improvements in methodology have led to 
a more  thorough  accounting for all sectors and integration with the 
NIPAs. With the exception of the Colombian accounts since 1970, some 
sections  of the Brazilian accounts, and the external accounts of Jamaica 
and Costa Rica, flow-of-funds accounting was performed on a stock- 
change basis. That is to say, the accounts give outstanding stocks of 
financial assets and liabilities and infer flows from the changes in the 
stocks, after making the appropriate valuation changes wherever pos- 
sible. The cases in  which  adjustments were or were not  made are 
discussed sector by sector below. Table 3.1, showing the ratio of total 
financial  assets in  the  economy to gross domestic product  (GDP), 
chronicles the increasing use of financial assets in the economies stud- 
ied. Almost none of the increase, as  table 3.2 indicates, was in monetary 
holdings;  almost all was in  more sophisticated  assets. Thus, the in- 
creased financial interrelatedness in the economy-the  extent to which 
the different sectors of the economy are bound up in financial relations 
with the rest of the economy, the subject of flow-of-funds study-was 156  Clark W.  ReynolddWayne Camard 
Table 3.1  Gross Financial Assets (percent of  GDP) 
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Sources: Brazil: Banco Central do Brasil 1973, supplementary tables; Banco Central do 
Brasil, n.d., table 3.13.2.1, p. 510. Colombia: Bancode IaRepiiblica  1971, table 1, p. 14. 
Costa Rica: Banco Central de Costa Rica, n.d., table 11-1, p. 25. Jamaica: Bank of Jamaica 
1974, pt. 1, table 3.00, p. 71; Department of Statistics ofJamaica 1973, account I, p. 17. 
Peru: Comision Nacional Supervisora de Empresas y Valores 1973, vol. 1, table 1, p.  18. 
Note: Average financial assestsiGDP for available years: Brazil (1962-69),  100 percent; 
Colombia (1962-69),  137 percent; Costa Rica (1961-71),  152 percent; Peru (1965-701, 
174 percent; and Jamaica (1964-69),  158 percent. 
Table 3.2  Monetary Holdings (percent of  GDP) 
Brazil  Colombia  Costa Rica  Jamaica  Peru 
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Sources: Brazil: Banco Central do Brasil  1973, supplementary tables; Banco Central do 
Brad,  n.d., table 3.13.2.1, p. 510. Colombia: Banco de la Repiiblica 1971, table 1. p. 14, 
and annex table  1, pp. 82-97.  Costa Rica: Banco Central de Costa Rica. n.d., table 11-2, 
p. 26. Jamaica: Bank of Jamaica  1974, pt. 2, app. 1. pp. 22-44;  Department of  Statistics 
of  Jamaica, Income and Product Accounts 1975, account I, p. 17. Peru: Comision Nacional 
Supervisora de Empresas y Valores 1973, vol.  1, table  I. p.  18, and table 20, p. 78. 
Note: MI  = currency and demand deposits. M2  = MI  + time deposits. 157  Flow-of-Funds in Latin America 
not due simply to a transactions motive. However, it is important not 
to compare the figures from table 3.1 across countries. With the ex- 
ception of  the comparatively high ratios for Costa Rica, the rank or- 
dering of  financial assets to GDP among the five countries tends to 
reflect the comprehensiveness of the flow-of-funds data rather than the 
relative degree of financial intermediation of the country concerned. 
Some indication of the strengths and weaknesses of these accounts 
may become apparent through the following examination of the sectoral 
treatment accorded the data. Particular attention will  be paid to the 
relation between the flow-of-funds treatment  in  the Organization of 
American States (OAS) system and the income and product account 
equivalents. While the major domestic source of net financial savings 
for use by other sectors is households, its treatment in the NIPAs is 
particularly  weak. For this reason, corporation, noncorporate enter- 
prise, government, rest of world, and financial system activities will 
be dealt with largely in terms of their interrelation with households. 
3.2.1  Households 
In  any  sort of national accounting framework, the  household  ac- 
counts are the most difficult to capture accurately, and FFAs are no 
exception. Many of the component figures were arrived at by assigning 
a fixed share of a particular type of asset to the household sector over 
time. Sometimes these shares were derived from survey data, but this 
was not always the case. Estimated holdings of currency and demand 
deposits in Jamaica and Colombia (before the integration of the ac- 
counts) will serve as useful examples. Currency held by households in 
Jamaica was found by assuming that firms held 5 percent of all currency 
in circulation, so that the household figure could be arrived at by de- 
ducting all other sectors from the national total. In Colombia, a similar 
method was used, with 10 percent of private-sector currency holdings 
assigned to firms. In  the case of demand deposits, the Coiombians 
calculated a share for official deposits at commercial and public-sector 
banks using surveys taken by the superintendent of banks in 1968 and 
1969. These shares were then deducted from aggregate deposits, and 
40 percent of the balance was assigned to families on the basis of a 
survey taken in  1971. Jamaica had readily available data on official 
deposits and used surveys from the early 1960s and 1972 to calculate 
a trend share of the remainder for households; the 1972 share was 46.9 
percent. 
Until the integrated national accounts for Colombia (which made use 
of  more  recent  U.N.  methodology),  the  NIPA figure for household 
saving in the five countries was a residual item derived from an erro- 
neous base. A fundamental assumption in the NIPAs is that investment 
by  households  is  zero.  A  precise  accounting  must  include  owner/ 158  Clark W.  ReynolddWayne Camard 
occupier-built  housing  as household  investment. Purchases of  con- 
sumer durables, treated as investment in the U.S. FFAs, could be- 
but are not-counted as well, though the derivation of the stream of 
services from these consumption investments would be seriously error 
prone.  In short, the NIPAs  are measuring net rather than gross in- 
vestment by households and misattributing some of it as well. 
Saving by households in the NIPAs is derived by taking the national 
accounting estimate of total saving and deducting savings by firms and 
government. Weaknesses in these other figures will be indicated in the 
appropriate section, but it is worth pointing out here that the figure for 
total saving is frequently figured as S = I  + X -  M where independent 
estimates of consumption are unavailable to cross-check with the more 
familiar S =  Y - C. The result is that inaccuracies in the figure for 
total investment translate one for one into inaccuracy in the household 
saving figure. Moreover, while the current account figure is among the 
most reliable  in the income and product account framework, under- 
invoicing of exports has been a chronic problem  in  Latin  America, 
resulting in an overstated current account deficit and again a one-for- 
one understatement of household saving. 
In addition, the real accounts are likely to underestimate household 
saving because of their derivation of it as  a residual item that is sensitive 
to underestimation of investment. The gross investment figure is gen- 
erally a composite index of a very incomplete set of measures of capital 
goods production, producers goods imports, cement production  as a 
proxy for construction, land clearing, and the like. It is not built up 
from physical  asset figures or a  more  comprehensive set of  capital 
formation estimates. 
A particularly important weakness of the household accounts is the 
nearly complete omission (except for Jamaican foreign exchange data 
for some years, unlikely to be a thorough accounting) of statistics on 
foreign assets and liabilities.  This issue will be discussed  more fully 
later,  but  some mention  here is appropriate. Recent discussions  of 
capital flight in the early 1980s have raised the question of “normal” 
levels of foreign asset holding; Diaz-Alejandro (1984, 377) speculated 
that Latin American households typically held 10 percent of their wealth 
overseas. It would have been useful to be able to test such assertions 
empirically. This is thus a particularly disheartening omission consid- 
ering its importance for current policy questions. 
3.2.2  Corporations 
The transactions of firms are only  slightly  easier to capture in  a 
national accounting framework than those of households, but this sec- 
tor presents a particularly thorny problem in the flow-of-funds context. 
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financial accounts. The way this has been handled in these FFAs has 
been to record new issues at book value and add retained earnings to 
the firms’ liabilities to shareholders. No attempt was made to capture 
the market value  of  the firm, only the flows. However, this  major 
divergence from the stock-differencing methodology hampers mean- 
ingful discussion of portfolio preferences based on outstanding asset 
balances. 
An  important element on the other side of  a firm’s balance  sheet 
that is quite difficult to record is the assets generated by sales on credit, 
whether interfirm suppliers’ credits or consumer credit. These figures 
are entirely missing from Brazil’s and Colombia’s (early) FFAs and no 
doubt contributed to Costa Rica’s decision to present a consolidated 
private sector in its FFAs. In Jamaica, survey data from the early 1960s 
was inflated along with personal consumption expenditures to estimate 
consumer credit from businesses, but no attempt was made to capture 
interfirm credit (Department of Statistics of Jamaica 1970). Only Peru, 
of  the five countries studied, estimates this particular figure, but the 
published accounts do not indicate the precise method used. 
Both investment and saving by firms are inaccurately measured in the 
NIPAs. Capital consumption allowances are thought to be overstated 
and some investment not captured by the accounts, though any actual 
investment by households erroneously boosts corporate investment. 
3.2.3  Noncorporate Enterprise 
This is a difficult sector to capture accurately and is only occasionally 
of independent analytic interest. Indeed, this is a great stumbling block 
in the construction of FFAs. Nowhere is it separately reported in either 
the NIPAs or the FFAs. In practice, noncorporate enterprise is treated 
in  several different ways. Costa Rica leaves the private  sector as a 
single sector. In the cases of Brazil, Colombia (early system), Jamaica, 
and Peru, it is necessary to estimate the sectoral dividing line between 
firms and households, and for Colombia (current system) noncorporate 
enterprise is lumped in  with households as a residual.  In the revised 
Colombian methodology, because the social accounts use the corporate 
balance sheets submitted to the Superintendencia de Sociedades (the 
government regulators of corporations), corporations are identified sep- 
arately, and noncorporate enterprises are classed with households. Nat- 
urally,  this  makes  the  analysis  of  Colombian  household  behavior 
somewhat problematic. This issue will be dealt with more fully in sec- 
tion 3.4. 
3.2.4  Government 
The figures for net financial saving in the FFAs are generally complete 
and correct. Indeed, it is precisely this financial measure, commonly 160  Clark W.  ReynolddWayne Camard 
referred to as the public-sector borrowing requirement, that is often 
looked to as the best measure of the government deficit. 
Income and product account figures for government saving and in- 
vestment are highly suspect, as government current expenditures are 
often disguised as investment. The net figure, thankfully, benefits from 
the offset of the two errors generated by the reclassification  of trans- 
actions. There may, however, be discrepancies between the two sets 
of accounts owing to differing classification of some autonomous gov- 
ernmental or quasi-governmental agencies. More important, the timing 
of receipts and expenditures may generate year-to-year fluctuations in 
the difference between the two that can be substantial. 
3.2.5  Rest of World 
Assets and liabilities of the rest-of-world  sector are frequently de- 
nominated in foreign currency. This subjects them to valuation changes 
that appear as flows  in  the domestic currency representation of the 
FFAs since the stock-change  methodology was used. An adjustment 
to the figure for outstanding claims needs to be made in order to ap- 
proximate the true flows. However, the obvious adjustment does not 
always bring the data into conformity with the flows recorded in the 
balance of payments (BPAs). It is  fortunate that, for at least  some 
countries in the group, devaluation was infrequent during the period 
of study. Costa Rica, in fact, maintained a completely stable exchange 
rate for the decade of the study.  Peru devalued  only once, in  1967. 
Jamaica, tied to sterling until 1972, moved against the U.S.  dollar until 
that date only in 1967 and 1971. In this case, though, there is a problem 
of deciding on the currency composition  of foreign assets: the usual 
dollar standard is likely to have been replaced with a dollar-pound mix. 
Assets and, especially, liabilities of the rest-of-world sector are prone 
to omission because of lack of data. In three out of five cases (Brazil, 
Costa Rica, and Jamaica), the FFA rest-of-world sector relies directly 
on the capital account of the BPAs. Where the sector is directly esti- 
mated, it is possible that foreign-sector assets are reported more fully 
than liabilities. In such a case, the discrepancy between the FFAs and 
the NIPAs gives an indication of that component of capital flight that 
is registered in the capital account of  the BPAs. Some countries use a 
residual from the BPAs, which will embrace part of these omissions, 
to estimate the relations between the foreign and the domestic private 
sectors. Export underinvoicing, so far as it can be estimated, provides 
an additional  source from which  capital  flight estimates can be im- 
proved, in this case capturing capital flight through the current account. 
A combination of these techniques holds the potential for finally getting 
more accurate figures for this very important phenomenon. Because 
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and financial flows, it permits an estimate of  “errors and omissions.” 
These errors and omissions figures are analogous to and form a part 
of  the discrepancy between real and financial flows that can be esti- 
mated  fully  only  through  the  availability of  both  real  and  financial 
accounts, the only such discrepancy available in routinely  compiled 
data. 
3.2.6  The Financial System 
A pure financial intermediary would show net financial saving of zero 
at all times since all its assets are financial and always equal its (all 
financial) liabilities.  In reality, however, financial intermediaries are 
corporations and do hold some real assets (offices, e.g.).  Statistical 
problems of  one sort or another may also contribute to the observed 
variation in net financial assets of  the financial system in the FFAs. 
The discrepancies are, in most cases, fairly small. Where they are not, 
they can be interpreted either as a problem related to data collection 
or as an item belonging properly to the corporate sector. The financial 
system, insofar as it appears in the NIPAs, is included in that sector, 
as it  should be.  It should also be noted  here that the monetary au- 
thorities are classified as part of the financial system, so that central 
bank holdings of government debt do in fact show up in the govern- 
ment’s intersectoral accounts. Thus, operating losses (or, less com- 
monly, profits) of the central bank, which can be substantial, may also 
contribute to the discrepancy between the two systems. 
This extremely brief introduction to the methods used to compile 
flow-of-funds statistics in Latin America is a testament to the ingenuity 
of the creators of these accounts. By concentrating on the weaknesses 
of the FFAs, we have perhaps left the impression that the accounts are 
weaker than they in fact are, but a catalog of the accurately recorded 
figures would  obscure  the  more  important  issues that  need  further 
improvement.  The next  section will  compare the  household  saving 
figure from the FFAs (which, as was mentioned earlier, is the weakest 
section of the accounts) with the corresponding figure from the NIPAs, 
and it will be seen that the FFAs compare quite favorably with their 
more established counterparts. 
3.3  A Comparison of  Household Saving 
The importance of attention to financial flows in the estimation of 
real saving is particularly  evident when one explores the household 
sector in Latin America. In the studies examined, sizable discrepancies 
appear when  FFA  estimates are compared with NIPA estimates of 
household saving. Household savings are always among the weakest 
figures in the NIPAs, even in industrial countries with well-developed 162  Clark W.  ReynolddWayne Camard 
statistical agencies, and the discrepancy between NIPA and FFA es- 
timates can be considerable. In Latin America, NIPA household savings 
have long been thought to be understated (see Mamalakis 1976), and 
are subject to substantial upward correction when matched  with the 
comparable figure from FFAs. 
Among the five countries examined, only Colombia, Peru, and Ja- 
maica have households as a separate sector in both the NIPAs and the 
FFAs.  For Colombia, we consider here only the years  1963-69,  the 
years of the original OAS study; for years after that, the accounts have 
been recalculated on the basis of the new U.N. methodology and in- 
tegrated, eliminating almost all the discrepancy (the earlier estimates 
of Colombian FFAs  appear in Banco de la Republica n.d.-a). 
The implications of the accompanying tables are quite striking. The 
FFAs  impute a level of  net financial saving to households that is, on 
the average over the sample periods, significantly higher than that of 
the NIPAs. The difference amounts to an increase in the ratio of house- 
hold  savings to GDP of  2.2 percent of  GDP in  Peru (table 3.31, 3.0 
percent in Jamaica (table 3.4), and 4.5 percent in Colombia (table 3.5). 
To illustrate the likely downward bias of the NIPA figures for household 
saving, savings in the real accounts are actually negative for 1966 and 
1969 in Colombia and for 1971, 1972, and 1973 in Jamaica, with con- 
Table 3.3  Peru: Household-Sector Savings: Comparison of FFAs and NIPAs 
FFA  FFA  FFA  FFA Change  NIPA  Statistical 
Assets  Liabilities  NFA  in NFA  Saving  Discrepancy 





















































































Sources: Cornision Nacional Supervisora de Ernpresas y Valores  1973, vol.  1,  table  I. 
p.  18. table 38, p.  114, and table 43, p.  126; Banco Central de Reserva del Peru  1974, 
table 5, pp.  18-19. 
Note: NFA  = net financial assets; N.A.  = not available. 
"Figures given in millions of  soles. 
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Table 3.4  Jamaica: Household-Sector Savings: Comparison of FFAs and 
NIPAs 
FFA  FFA  FFA  FFA Change  NIPA  Statistical 
Assets  Liabilities  NFA  in NFA  Saving  Discrepancy 
(1)  (2)  (1) - (2)  (3)  (4)  (3) - (4) 
1964" 
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Sources: Bank of Jamaica 1974, pt.  1,  table 3.16,  p.  103, and table 3.22, p.  114; Bank of 
Jamaica, n.d., table 4,  p.  IS; Department of  Statistics of  Jamaica  1973, account  1,  p. 
17, and account 5,  p. 21. 
Nore: NFA = net financial assets. 
aFigures given in millions of Jamaican dollars. 
hFigures given as percentage of GDP. 
sistently low rates in both countries. The figures for Peru are also quite 
low, though here it is an FFA figure that suggests dissaving, in this case 
for 1967. 
It is also possible to report a distinct figure for household saving for 
Brazil from the FFAs (table 3.6), even though the household sector is 
not broken out of the NIPAs. These data suggest a household saving 
rate similar to those reported in the FFAs for the other countries, with 
an average of 4.4 percent of GDP for the four years reported. In prin- 
ciple, it would also be possible to report a net financial savings estimate 
for businesses on the basis of  the FFAs. This could be done by  de- 
ducting the FFA estimate of household savings from the NIPA figure 
for private-sector savings. This would, however, be inaccurate. The 
NIPA figure for private-sector saving is subject to underestimation be- 
cause of  all the  "upstream"  problems discussed in  section 3.2. De- 
ducting from this a substantially  correct figure for household  saving 164  Clark W.  ReynolddWayne Camard 
Table 3.5  Colombia: Household-Sector Savings: Comparison of FFAs and 
NlPAs 
FFA  FFA  FFA  FFA Change  NIPA  Statistical 
Assets  Liabilities  NFA  in NFA  Saving  Discrepancy 
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Sources: Banco de la Republica 1971, table 9, p. 20; Banco de la Republica, n.d. = g, 
table 4, p. 33; Banco de la Republica, n.d.  = h, table 4, p. 6. 
Note: NFA  = net financial assets; N.A. = not available. 
aFigures given in billions of  pesos. 
bFigures given as percentage of  GDP. 
would accordingly leave us with an underestimated figure for firm sav- 
ing. It bears repeating, especially in the case of Brazil (for which we 
report a figure without an alternative source for comparison), that there 
are substantial problems with these figures. However, they do consis- 
tently point in the direction in which we know the true figures to lie, 
thus adding to the information available from NIPAs. 
This has important implications for the role of financial policy in a 
developing economy. Giving credence to the artificially low personal 
saving rate that appears in the NIPAs can lead to an unduly pessimistic 
appraisal of the role that households can play in the mobilization of 
capital resources. In the same vein, the opportunity costs of financial 
repression are likely to be understated, and so the bias of the NIPA 
saving figures can lead to an overreliance on restrictive capital market 
policies.  To  know that  a  well-designed capital market development 
program  could raise the  rate of  personal  saving by  50 percent  is a 
different thing when that rate is 2 percent of GDP from what it is when 
that rate is 6 percent. Table 3.6  Brazil: Private-Sector Net Financial Savings 
Private Sector  Private Sector 
NlPAa  FFAa  Firms: FFAa  Households: FFAa  NIPAh  FFAh  Firms: FFAb  Households: FFAb 
1960  -58  -  28  -  126  98  -2.1  -1.0  -4.6  3.6 
1963  330  -  13  -510  497  2.8  -.I  -  4.3  4.2 
1966  500  -  1,559  -  4,355  2,796  .9  -2.9  -8.1  5.2 
1969  5,110  -7,980  -  14,392  6,412  3.8  -6.0  -  10.8  4.8 
Sources: Banco Central do Brasil 1973, supplementary tables; Fundasgo Getulio Vargas 1973, tables 5, and 7. 
aFigures given in millions of  cruzeiros. 
bFigures given in percentage of  GDP. 166  Clark W.  Reynolds/  Wayne Camard 
It is to be expected, from the considerations discussed  in  section 
3.2, that the FFAs  will  provide  a  more  comprehensive coverage of 
household savings than do the NIPAs. This is because the accumulation 
of financial assets and liabilities of households is directly covered by 
the financial accounts (except for informal sector transactions, many 
of which are interhousehold flows that would net out in the accounts 
anyway). Also,  while  the informal  sector of the real economy may 
escape reporting in the NIPAs, the financial flows that they permit may 
well be captured in  the FFAs as changes in  financial savings of the 
producing units (which appear as households).  It must be admitted, 
though, that, in cases in which there is severe financial disintermedia- 
tion,  the portion of the informal  credit market that is not  captured 
directly in the FFAs may well assume significant proportions. There 
also may be some underreporting of consumer credit and other lending 
from business to households in the FFAs that could exaggerate the net 
financial savings of households vis-8-vis the real accounts. Under such 
circumstances, the real  account estimates of financial savings could 
approach-or  even exceed-those  of the FFAs. 
As useful as they are in improving the NIPAs, the significance of these 
estimates of household saving extends beyond their usefulness for re- 
finement of the statistical source. In general, households are the only 
net-saving domestic sector in  a modern economy. From an economic 
policy perspective, it is clearly important to know the resources poten- 
tially available for deployment, the more so since the FFA estimates per- 
mit us to revise the figure for household saving sharply upward. Any 
attempt to increase the gross saving in the economy must rely on cap- 
turing the financial savings of households. The next section will examine 
more closely the recent experience of Colombia and will show the sus- 
ceptibility of financial savings of households (albeit firm-households) to 
both deliberate manipulation and circumstantial adjustment. 
3.4  A Case Study of Colombia, 1970-83 
As was mentioned earlier, Colombia has integrated its NIPAs with 
the FFAs for the years since I970 and has produced flow-based figures 
up through  1983 with a substantially smaller discrepancy between the 
real and financial accounts and an improved set of NIPAs. The avail- 
ability of both  sets of accounts at the sectoral  level permits  one to 
observe the interaction  between  real and financial savings of house- 
holds. This type of  information is particularly important in identifying 
the net effect of financial policy and real economic shocks on voluntary 
financial savings as a source of actual and potential resources available 
for accumulation  and  growth. It  illustrates  that greater attention to 167  Flow-of-Funds in Latin America 
policies favoring the use of funds for investment rather than consump- 
tion lending may be critical in permitting financial savings to realize 
their real accumulation potential. 
From a policy perspective, five periods may be identified for Col- 
ombia during the seventies and early eighties (Jaramillo 1982; World 
Bank 1984; Brock 1980).  The pattern they show is one in which a heavily 
repressed economy liberalizes partially, returns to repression, and then 
liberalizes more fully. The major macroeconomic characteristics of each 
period are summarized in table 3.7. 
3.4.1  1970-72:  Financial Repression 
During these years, financial policy by and large continued the pre- 
liberalization measures of  the 1960s, with government ceilings on lend- 
ing and borrowing rates, credit rationing in the formal financial sector, 
and financial disintermediation. While in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
some of the interest ceilings were raised and the country moved from 
a fixed to a crawling peg exchange rate, Colombia began the 1970s in 
conditions fundamentally  similar to those in many developing coun- 
tries. Attempts to restrict  nominal interest rate responses to inflation 
led to financial repression, the problems of proliferating informal credit 
market  activity  (the “extrabank”  market), less  than optimal  saving 
rates, and investment inefficiency. 
3.4.2 
In 1972, although credit markets remained subject to regulation, a new 
instrument, inflation indexed, was introduced for the express  purpose of 
funding housing finance. This first step was partial at best. This new in- 
strument came to be known by the name of the indexing unit, the UPAC 
(“unit of constant purchasing power”). While UPACs enjoyed under- 
standable success in attracting voluntary savings into residential con- 
struction, much of their growth involved a shift in portfolios out of less- 
favored  financial  instruments.  (UPACs  are  included  in  “savings 
1972-74:  First Step to Liberalization 
Table 3.7  Financial Policy Regimes in  Colombia, 1970-83 
Period  Financial Policy  Economic Conditions 
1970-72  Financial repression  Rapid growth 
Low inflation 
1972-74  First steps to liberalization  Accelerating inflation 
1974-76  LiberdliZatiOn is broadened  “Growth recession,”  1975 
1971-79  Stabilization and financial repression  Coffee boom 
1979-83  Increasing liberalization  Coffee “bust” 
External deficits 168  Clark W.  ReynolddWayne Camard 
deposits” in the tables. They show considerable growth as a share of 
household financial savings over the period [table 3.81, even though fi- 
nancial savings as a share of GDP did not rise significantly [table 3.91.) 
3.4.3  1974-76:  Liberalization Is Broadened 
These were years of more extensive, though still incomplete, finan- 
cial liberalization. Interest rates were increased across the board, with 
limits placed on the indexing of UPACs to reduce their preferred status, 
which had led to considerable diversion of funds out of other assets. 
Indeed, there was speculation that the UPAC was devised to be a “foot 
in the door” for broader liberalization. Time and savings deposit rates 
were raised (though not deregulated) along with yields on government 
bonds, though the interest on the latter lost its tax exemption. 
3.4.4  1977-79:  Stabilization and Financial Repression 
The fourth period involved the imposition of  restrictive credit poli- 
cies in  order to prevent  increased export revenues from generating 
inflation. Improved coffee terms of trade and expansion of  the “other 
economy” (illegal drug exports) caused a considerable increase in dol- 
lar earnings. To  prevent  this  expansion of  the  monetary  base  from 
increasing the monetary aggregates and stimulating inflation, the au- 
thorities implemented a program that included import and foreign bor- 
rowing restrictions, a fiscal surplus, and increased reserve requirements. 
Table 3.8  Colombian Household Financial Investment by Asset Type 
Investment Shares (percent of  annual total) 
Savings  Other Long-  Other Short- 





















































































Sources: Banco de la Republica, n.d.  = b, table 15a; Banco de la Repliblica, n.d. = f. 
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Table 3.9  Colombia Firm-Household Data (percent of  GDP) 
Net Real  Net Financial  Asset  Liability 



































































































Sources: Banco de la Republica, n.d.-b, table  1; Banco de la Republica, n.d.-c, table 1; 
Banco de la Republica, n.d.-e, table  1; Banco de la Republica, n.d.-f.  table  1. 
As  intended, the share of  savings flowing into money and savings de- 
posits fell sharply between 1976 and 1979 (table 3.8), but the figures in 
table 3.9 indicate that net financial saving of households still rose sig- 
nificantly as a share of GDP. 
3.4.5  1979-83:  Increasing Liberalization 
In  1979 and 1980, a number of  fundamental changes took place in 
financial policy; most important were the liberalization of  important 
lending and borrowing rates, the removal of  100 percent marginal re- 
serve requirements, and the introduction of marketable short-term gov- 
ernment securities. This caused a considerable increase in both deposit 
and lending rates from their earlier repressed levels.  Though net  fi- 
nancial savings of  households as a share of GDP remained fairly stable 
during the period of  policy transition from  1979 to 1981, the ensuing 
years showed a sharp decline (table 3.9). This was almost certainly 
due to the slowdown in real growth (which had averaged 5.4 percent 
per year from 1976 to 1980 and fell to 1.6 percent from 1981 to 1983) 
that accompanied  the decline in  export revenue.  During the period 
1981-83,  there was a  reversal of  net  foreign savings as the capital 
account of the balance of payments,  which had  been negative from 
1975 to 1980, became a deficit averaging 4.8 percent of GDP during the 
period 1981-83  (table 3.10). 
Before examining the Colombian FFA  data in  depth, there are two 
issues particular to Colombia that need to be discussed: the parallel econ- 
omy and the sectorization of the accounts. To  a considerable degree, the 170  Clark W.  ReynoldslWayne Camard 
Table 3.10  Colombian Saving and Investment 
Current Account  Inflation  GDP Growth 
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Sources; Banco de la Republica, n.d.-b, table 1;  Banco de la Republica, n.d.-c, table I; 
Banco de la Republica, n.d.-e, table I; Banco de la Republica, n.d.-f, table 1;  International 
Monetary Fund 1986 (inflation data only). 
aFigures given in percentage of  GDP. 
bA minus sign ( -) indicates a surplus 
drug economy functions like a traditional  Latin  American enclave and 
does not  grossly distort either the real or the financial accounts.  Col- 
ombia’s informal credit market does include a small-scale consumer loan 
market.  For most informal credit market operations,  though, firms are 
the principle takers and a frequent source of funds, so that these trans- 
actions appear in the balance sheets incorporated in  the FFA corporate 
sector. The parallel market is thus not as important a source of error in 
the FFAs as might be imagined. 
In  what follows,  the sector is  referred  to interchangeably  as the 
household sector and the firm-household sector. The difference is that, 
in a great many instances, the household has the option of investing 
its  earnings  in  the  family  enterprise rather  than  a  financial  asset. 
McKinnon’s  (1973) analysis  of  the  “fragmented  economy,”  which 
chronicles the lack of investment opportunities and savings vehicles in 
a developing economy, emphasizes the difficulty of separating the fam- 
ily’s savings decision from its entrepreneurial investment decision. Given 
the difficulty,  even in  industrial countries, of distinguishing  noncor- 
porate enterprise from household  transactions, the treatment of the 
two as a single sector in Colombia seems wholly justified. 
Household-sector savings as estimated in the earlier NIPAs prior to 
their integration with the financial accounts can be compared with the 
postintegration  accounts for the years 1970-74.  The results  support 171  Flow-of-Funds in Latin America 
the contention that FFA estimates provide a more comprehensive figure 
for the residual of household savings over investment than traditional 
(nonintegrated) NIPAs and that integrated real and financial accounts 
do an even better job. During these years, the household saving figure 
under the earlier system averaged 2.7 percent of GDP, a ratio that is 
somewhat higher than the figures for the 1960s examined in the previous 
section. But, in the same years (1970-74),  the comparable figures in 
the integrated social accounts is 8.0 percent. The difference between 
these two figures is reasonably close to the difference of  4.5 percent 
found by comparing the NIPAs with the FFAs for the 1960s. In short, 
the initial OAS FFAs, despite the degree of disintermediation in those 
earlier years, were  able to identify a serious downward  bias in  the 
NIPA estimates of household saving. Given the critical importance of 
household saving to the noninflationary finance of public and private 
investment and debt service, it is imperative that such estimates be as 
accurate as possible. 
If  one were to compare the net real saving of the household sector 
as reported in the NIPAs with the net financial saving from the financial 
accounts, the difference is almost zero. While a slight statistical dis- 
crepancy does exist, it is quite small for most of the years and shows 
no systematic bias.  For only eight years out of fourteen does the fi- 
nancial account figure exceed the corresponding figure of the real ac- 
counts, and the average premium is only 0.2 percent of GDP. Thus, 
the large discrepancy reported for Colombia in section 3.3 for the years 
prior to the new, integrated account estimates appears to have been 
entirely corrected by the revised real saving figure, as one would have 
expected, leaving only a small residual between the two sets of accounts. 
What did households do with their savings? One of the main objec- 
tives of financial policy from the very beginning of liberalization was to 
increase real savings and channel them into productive investment and 
noninflationary finance of the public deficit. It is possible to determine 
the effectiveness of such efforts once comprehensive real and financial 
accounts are available. One can derive two types of disaggregation from 
the financial accounts in order to address such questions. First, asset 
accumulation may be divided by type of asset, which is done for house- 
holds in table 3.8. For this purpose, we have divided financial assets into 
five categories: (1) money, including demand deposits; (2)  various forms 
of savings deposits; (3) equity capital, including partnership investment 
as well as corporate shares; (4) other long-term assets (having a maturity 
of more than two years); and (5)  other short-term assets. The results 
show how the composition of household asset portfolios adjusted to real 
and financial conditions during the period studied. Note that the inte- 
grated accounts from Colombia deal with annual flows rather than end- 
year stocks and reflect only actual intersectoral transactions rather than 172  Clark W.  ReynolddWayne Camard 
valuation adjustments (Pinot de Libreros, Vinasco Medina, and Riveros 
Mora 1982).  The difficulties that were examined in section 3.2 in moving 
from  stock measures to  flow  measures were bypassed. Our second 
breakdown of financial flows in table 3.11 disaggregates them by insti- 
tutional sectors of origin and destination. All domestic household trans- 
actions are divided into three main sectors: corporations, government, 
and the financial system. It is an unfortunate limitation of the available 
data that household transactions with the rest of the world are not pre- 
sented as independent estimates. The omission of resource flows be- 
tween households and proprietary firms is equally lamentable. 
We  look first at the aggregate accumulation of assets and liabilities. 
We turn next to the examination of asset portfolio adjustment and finally 
to an examination of intersectoral flows. 
The firm-household sector accumulated financial assets at an average 
rate of 8.5 percent of GDP over our fourteen-year sample period while 
accumulating liabilities at a rate of just under 5 percent of GDP. In the 
period  1970-72,  prior to liberalization, households acquired financial 
assets valued  at an average of  8.4 percent of GDP while  acquiring 
liabilities in  an average amount equal to 5.2 percent of GDP; net  fi- 
nancial saving thus averaged 3.2 percent of GDP. Since the years from 
1972 to  1980 involved  different  degrees of  partial  liberalization,  as 
Table 3.11  Colombian Household  Financial Flows by  Sector (percent of total) 
Assets  Liabilities 
Financial  Financial 











































60.8  35.1 
50.4  22.3 
58.4  30. I 
59.9  36.3 
66.4  30.7 
60.2  2.2 
64.7  33.4 
78.5  25.0 
80.7  6.8 
79.6  35.4 
62.9  39.5 
55.9  45.9 
72.9  41.6 





























Sources: Banco de la Republica, n.d.-b, tables 26a-42b;  Banco de la Republica, n.d.-c. 
tables A-I-A  19; Banco de la Republica, n.d.-e, tables A-I -A-19;  Banco de la Republica, 
n.d.-f, tables A-I-A-19. 
Nore: Figures represent shares of  net increases in financial assets and liabilities. 173  Flow-of-Funds in Latin America 
described at the beginning of this section, all of which went well beyond 
the policies of the 1960s and early 1970s, the period is best taken as a 
whole.  Excluding the slow-growth year of  1975, financial assets grew 
by an average of 9.1 percent  of GDP from  1972 to 1980 as against a 
5.1 percent growth of liabilities, causing net financial savings to rise to 
4.0 percent of GDP (table 3.9), 0.8 percent above the “preliberaliza- 
tion”  rate. In the liberalized (but recessionary) period  1981 -83,  assets 
grew  by  only  7.8 percent of GDP,  with  liabilities also growing  at a 
reduced  rate of 4.2 percent  of GDP, cutting net financial savings of 
households back to 3.6  percent of GDP, midway between the two earlier 
periods. 
The implications of these figures are quite interesting. They suggest 
that a partial financial liberalization did encourage firm-households to 
acquire more financial assets as a share of income without triggering 
a boom in  consumer lending that would  have offset any increase in 
financial saving. It is important to note in this regard that substantial 
liberalization, with the exception of UPACs, did not begin until  1974. 
In fact, the greatest spurt of household borrowing was associated with 
the UPAC system and consequent boom in housing construction. The 
years  1973  and  1974  constituted  the peak  for household  borrowing, 
with new financial liabilities equal to 6.5 and 7.3 percent of GDP, re- 
spectively. Hence, net financial saving by households had fallen to 1.9 
percent of GDP in  1974 (table 3.9), a full percentage point below the 
net real saving figure from the NIPAs. 
Only after 1976 did net financial saving grow significantly, coinciding 
as much with the export boom as with financial liberalization  per se. 
It may well be that the coffee boom gave households the wherewithal 
to finance their purchases out of income rather than taking up loans 
that were available. Certainly, a rational household would increase its 
net saving (out of transitory income) during a cyclical boom, irrespec- 
tive of additional incentives provided by financial liberalization. But 
the availability of attractive financial assets would certainly provide an 
incentive to hold those savings in a form that would be more readily 
available for productive investment (rather than, e.g., inflation hedges). 
And  1979, the peak of the coffee boom, was also the lowest year in 
the sample in growth of household liabilities. It looks as though  one 
effect of liberalization was simply to increase the rate of acquisition of 
both financial assets and financial liabilities. But this also places greater 
emphasis on policies to direct the use of funds into investment rather 
than consumption expenditures. 
For the final period  1981-83,  economic downturn was the dominant 
characteristic4DP  grew by only 1.6 percent per year from 1981 to 1983. 
By  contrast, from  1970  to  1980  (again excluding  1975) the Colombian 
economy grew at a rate of  6.1 percent. Public administration, which had 174  Clark W.  ReynolddWayne Camard 
shown a surplus in both the real and the financial accounts from 1974 to 
1980, moved into deficit, with that deficit reaching 3 percent of GDP by 
1983. As we have seen, these events show up clearly in the household 
FFA aggregates. As could be expected, asset accumulation slows by 1.3 
percent of GDP, and liability growth falls by 0.9 percent of GDP, resulting 
in a fall in net saving of just under half a percentage point of GDP. 
Turning now to the composition of this growth in household financial 
asset holdings  (table 3.8), we focus particularly  on the effect of in- 
creased financial liberalization. As mentioned above, perhaps the most 
important element of this was the introduction of the UPAC-indexed 
savings deposit. As it happens, Colombian inflation increased  during 
the 1970s from an average of under 10 percent per year in the period 
1970-72  to  24 percent from  1973-83.  The result  was a  shift not  so 
much out of money  as out of longer-term assets. This accords well 
with the observation that the extrabank credit market, which  mush- 
roomed during the financially repressed years of the coffee boom, was 
heavily concentrated in short-term lending. 
Though the figures are highly variable from year to year since they 
reflect  marginal shifts in portfolios,  the pattern is quite clear. In the 
process of financial  liberalization, while incremental  money holdings 
and “other short-term assets” held a steady share of the total increase 
in  assets, new  equity (shares plus partnership investment) fell from 
27.1 percent in  1970-72  to 15.1 percent from 1973 to 1983, and “other 
long-term assets” fell from  15.1 to 9.6 percent of total increases. At 
the same time, savings deposits (including UPAC deposits) skyrocketed 
from 7.9 to 22.3 percent of the total. From the boom of the 1970s into 
the slump of  the  1980s, savings deposits grew  even further, at the 
expense of  other short-term assets.  A  slight decline in  incremental 
money holdings, corresponding  to the slower rate of income and there- 
fore transactions growth, was the only other significant change into the 
early 1980s. 
These changes in asset holdings had important effects on the sectoral 
distribution of the increase in firm-household assets as shown in table 
3.11. The most significant  shift among sectors between 1970-72  and 
1973-83 was the sharp  decline in household claims against government, 
from  14.8 percent to 3.3 percent, offset by increases in assets of the 
financial system from 56.5 percent to 67.9 percent. This represents in 
part the strong fiscal position of the government in the years of the 
coffee boom and in part increases in minimum denominations for some 
public-sector liabilities. The net assets of households against the busi- 
ness sector remained the same 28.8 percent over the two periods. On 
the liability side, household liabilities to business also showed almost 
no change (29.2 percent  in the first period  as against 28.7 percent  in 175  Flow-of-Funds in Latin America 
the years of liberalization), while liabilities to the financial system rose 
from 5 1.5 percent to 56.4 percent of  the total increment. This further 
illustrates that financial opening such as Colombia experienced can 
effectively increase the amount of financial savings of households avail- 
able for channeling into investment through the financial system. 
The preceding analysis has been conducted from the vantage of the 
firm-household sector. It might well have been repeated for the cor- 
porate sector. Table 3.12, though, shows that corporate saving remained 
fairly steady throughout the period being examined (reflecting in part 
the steady rate of  capital consumption) and that the investment rate 
varies mostly with the business cycle (table 3.13). An important reason 
for this is likely to be the ability of the larger enterprises represented 
in the corporate sector to get access to credit. Table 3.14 outlines the 
forms this  credit  took.  Leff  (1976,  1978, 1979) and Strachan  (1976) 
discuss the ways in  which financial conglomerates (grupos) in Latin 
America ensure themselves a supply of credit. In the Colombian case, 
Tybout (1980, 1983, 1984) has established a clear link between firm size 
and credit access. The phenomenal growth of grupos through takeovers 
during the 1970s makes the analysis of the corporate sector accounts 
even more difficult. Further work on corporation finance at the micro 
level would be an essential complement  to analysis of  that  sector’s 
aggregate flow of funds. 
Table 3.U  Colombia Corporation Data (percent of  GDP) 
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Sources: Banco de la Republica, n.d.-b,  table 1; Banco de la Republica, n.d.-c,  table  1; 
Banco de la Republica, n.d.-e, table  1; Banco de la Republica, n.d.-f,  table  1. 
Nore: NFS = net financial saving. Table 3.13  Colombian Corporate Asset Growth (percent of GDP) 
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Sources: Banco de la Republica, n.d.-b,  tables  1,  14a; Banco de la Republica, n.d.-c,  tables  1, 15; Banco 
de la Republica, n.d.-e,  tables  1, 15; Banco de la Republica, n.d.-f, tables  1, 15. 
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Table 3.14  Colombian Corporate Liability Growth (percent of GDP) 
Commercial  Domestic 
Year  Total  Credit  Loans  Equity 
1970  16.3  6.0  5.8  2.9 
1971  11.2  2.3  4.3  3.3 
1972  13.4  2.0  5.9  3.3 
1973  12.3  5.6  3.0  2.7 
1974  12.5  3.5  4.8  3.0 
1975  9.2  2.7  3.6  1.9 
1976  11.9  3.8  5.1  2.1 
1977  15.3  3.2  9.1  2.4 
1978  14.8  4.5  7.9  1.9 
1979  11.9  .7  7.7  2.3 
1980  18.1  4.6  9.3  2.3 
1981  14.8  3.7  7.5  2.6 
1982  13.8  3.9  6.0  1.9 
1983  12.3  2.9  6.1  1.9 
Sources: Banco de la Repdblica, n.d.-b, tables  1,  14b; Banco de la Republica, n.d.-c, 
tables  1, 15; Banco de la Republica, n.d.-e, tables 1,  15; Banco de la Repdblica, n.d.-f, 
tables 1,  15. 
3.5  Conclusions 
By presenting evidence from the FFAs, NIPAs, and integrated social 
accounts of several countries from Latin America and one from the 
Caribbean, it has been possible to illustrate the importance of source 
and use of  funds analysis to an assessment of the effect of  real and 
financial changes on developing countries. Academic attention to fi- 
nancial sector development led to important steps in  the direction of 
financial liberalization in the 1970s. These steps caused a reduction in 
the degree of financial repression and disintermediation resulting from 
the imposition of interest rate ceilings, credit rationing, and other con- 
trols on financial markets. Evidence has been presented that financial 
liberalization did in fact increase financial intermediation of household 
savings. 
However, one danger with liberalization is the threat that financial 
intermediation might inadvertently offset gross financial savings with 
dissaving by  other sectors (for consumption lending and funding of 
government current expenditures), thus preventing the potential real 
savings and investment out of income from being fully realized. While 
the present study is not designed to pursue these inquiries in depth or 
to deal with issues of financial development policy, it suggests that such 
an endeavor would be extremely productive, especially in the present 
period of Third World indebtedness and the need to resort to internal 
sources of  accumulation for recovery, restructuring, and growth. 178  Clark W.  ReynolddWayne Camard 
In addition, the study illustrates the value of flow-of-funds analyses, 
even of a relatively rudimentary kind, in identifying possible gaps be- 
tween actual levels of household savings and those reported in NIPAs. 
The  Colombian case is  particularly compelling in this  regard, as  it 
shows how the increase of several percentage points of GDP in personal 
savings uncovered by the earlier OAS Capital Markets Project FFAs 
was in time eliminated by the country’s statisticians through the prep- 
aration of integrated real and financial flow accounts. It is unfortunate 
that Colombia is one of the only countries in the earlier OAS project 
that elected to continue its flow-of-funds accounting and to integrate 
it into improved national income accounting procedures. The impor- 
tance of  institutional cooperation between  the central bank and the 
national  statistical  office, in  this  case, along with  the  use  of  U.N. 
supported advisers cannot be overstated. Unfortunately, however, the 
use of the resulting estimates has been limited to research by only a 
few economists,  and  the  data have  been  relatively  ignored outside 
Colombia. 
It is quite likely that the potential for analysis of the relation between 
financial structure and growth in developing countries is only beginning 
to be realized, and a considerable increase in  attention to such work 
may  lie ahead. This will be especially important as both lending and 
borrowing countries and international  institutions rediscover the im- 
portance  of  financial policies that will  attract domestic savings into 
development finance (Reynolds 1978, 1979; Reynolds and Camard 1988). 
There are roles  to be  played by  FFAs and  by  integrated  social ac- 
counting as instruments of development policy. 
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COll"Xlt  Nathaniel H. Leff 
Introduction 
This  paper by  Clark  W.  Reynolds  and  Wayne  Camard  offers the 
prospect of new, disaggregated data, based on flow-of-funds analysis, 
for the study of savings behavior in less-developed countries (LDCs). 
That prospect is all the more welcome because of the inadequacies of 
the estimates compiled within the framework of the national  income 
and product accounts (NIPAs). Data limitations, however, hamper the 
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capacity of the authors to deliver as much as one would like in the way 
of improved and more reliable savings estimates. 
The research is motivated by the assumption that saving is crucial 
for economic development. Consequently, it would help to have more 
(and better) data to facilitate understanding of the conditions that pro- 
mote domestic saving in LDCs. I am sympathetic to this general ap- 
proach. But it is worth noting that, for many economists, the operational 
paradigm in the field of economic development no longers accords so 
central a role to saving and physical capital formation (Krueger 1986). 
Much more emphasis is now accorded to such conditions as human 
capital formation, external trade, and foreign-exchange availability. Even 
within the new paradigm, however, saving remains important for eco- 
nomic development. Here, Reynolds and Camard are correct in noting 
that the hypotheses presently available to explain savings behavior in 
developing countries do not have much predictive power. 
To  illustrate,  some Latin American  countries have shown upward 
trends in their aggregate saving ratios during the past three decades. 
By contrast, other countries in the region have experienced statistically 
significant  negative  trends. Available models of saving in developing 
countries are not  very helpful in  explaining this observed behavior. 
Further, the present state of the analytical literature is such that econ- 
omists have little in the way of tested, practicable advice to recommend 
to policymakers in Latin America who might be interested in raising 
domestic saving rates in their countries. In this context, the prospect 
that flow-of-funds analysis may make available new and better-quality 
data on savings behavior in individual countries is extremely attractive. 
More accurate statistical  information  should  help raise the level  of 
analysis. The availability of new, disaggregated data would permit the 
application in an LDC context of  previously unused analytic models. 
Reynolds and Camard report sparse flow-of-funds data for five Latin 
American countries (Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Peru, and Jamaica) 
as well as more complete information for one country, Colombia. 
The Flow-of-Funds Results and Their Implications 
As careful scholars, Reynolds and Camard take pains to explain the 
methodological limitations of the flow-of-funds studies that they report. 
That discussion points to a series of approximations that culminate in 
doubts concerning the reliability of the results. The authors share these 
doubts. They must be taken into account in assessing the usefulness 
of the results. 
The paper’s main substantive finding is that the flow-of-funds results 
show household saving to be substantially higher than estimated in the 
NIPAs for these five countries. This is an important finding; however, 182  Clark W.  ReynoldsIWayne Camard 
it is not entirely clear what to make of it. Part of the disparity  may 
reflect the behavioral porosity of  the corporate and household sectors 
in the LDCs. In such conditions, it is difficult to allocate uniquely to 
one sector or  the other flows that belong to essentially the same agents. 
To the extent that strong substitution effects exist as between the two 
components of private saving, the policy implications of higher-than- 
expected household saving are weakened. 
I think it is fair to conclude from this paper that flow-of-funds analysis 
of saving in LDCs can be a useful complement to the estimates de- 
veloped  in  the NIPA  framework. The two sets of estimates do not 
always tell the same story. The paper also suggests new directions for 
future work on flow-of-funds research in developing countries. First, 
it may be useful to refocus from the present emphasis on the household 
sector to an emphasis on saving in the corporate sector. Because of 
corporate reporting requirements, such a refocusing may mitigate data 
problems.  Further, the availability of flow-of-funds data for the cor- 
porate sector would permit application and development of some of 
the analytic models that have been elaborated to apply corporate fi- 
nance theory in the special context of the LDCs (Galvez and Tybout 
1985; Sundararajan 1985). 
In view of the greater richness-in  depth and in time-of  the flow- 
of-funds data available for Colombia, greater attention might be given 
to analyzing financial flows, saving, and investment for that country. 
Two topics come immediately to mind: the interaction of the individual 
sectoral components of aggregate saving and their joint responsiveness 
to changing economic conditions and policy incentives. Apart from the 
possible  analytic and policy benefits from that research, such use of 
flow-of-funds statistics may also help increase the demand for collecting 
these data (see below). 
It is also fair to learn something from the history of flow-of-funds 
research in Latin America. Despite the long-standing efforts of those 
concerned for such research, flow-of-funds estimates are still not pre- 
pared on a regular basis for many developing countries. A reason for 
the absence of this statistical output seems to be the lack of demand 
for these data on the part of economists in these countries. I expect 
the future to be like the past in this respect. To  the extent that econ- 
omists in Latin America are not educated to the potential uses of flow- 
of-funds statistics, they will not demand them. In practice, I do not 
see any such wave  of  education on  the uses of  flow-of-funds  data 
reaching the graduate schools that Latin American economists attend, 
either in their own countries or in the United States. Consequently, it 
is unlikely that demand for flow-of-funds statistics will  increase  sig- 
nificantly. Accordingly, neither will the resources allocated for the prep- 
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In that event, research to improve the quality of the savings data in 
Latin America may follow a different route: more surveys to enhance 
the accuracy of the NIPA estimates. Some of these surveys-in  par- 
ticular those identifying and addressing the weak points in the NIPA 
estimates-may  well  be  informed  by  flow-of-funds  perspectives. In 
effect, we may see the fusion of the two approaches in improved NlPAs. 
This paper can be a milestone in such an evolution. 
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